

Oct 20

- Oct 27 Transcript:

no suspicion that VZ was
not authorized, or that AA
was independent.

- JFK wants to trade: asks only,
immediate balt to construction
while negots.

(But RFK asks dispute starts -
no public trade -

~~therefore~~ JFK did not want to
reject trade . Oct 27

- because he wanted & expected
to accept it (cf Oct 28)

- because he thought rejection
would be denounced if known
publicly


(K could have made RFK's
rejection public; and/or made public
his "promise" of trade would of
Jewish circles "if" (crisis settled;
no public mention]

[Do over transcript;
compare to Nitz
compare to Edie. Summary
(convert Kaplan?
but Globe?)

Tell? ~~OK~~

1. RFK warning: 3 alerts
told to me '64

2.



It seems that Pius did not share
his colleagues/determination to trade
— rather than strike — on Oct 28, with
McN, or Ball — or they wouldn't have
been so worried, last evening / on morning.

Did he with McG B? ("Not informed"
by Pius now.)

With RFK?!

(Was this why he moved with RFK
on hearing of the war? rather than
tell him?)

Was McN urged / expected to
read RFK memoirs, because of
48-hour warnings — or because of recent
Jumbo deal? Which "went beyond
his instructions?"

Ask McG B

Oct 20

87

Who wrote Time Essay - 1982?

(ask Talbott?)

Wf didn't try tell the truth then?

(Because try had all
designed with JFK? or had try,
only?

Couldn't admit about lost?

JFK wildly to lose?

DO WE HAVE TO WAIT 25 YEARS FOR N/HAR NAT SEC TAPES?

Wf did McG admit now? is. transcribe

Wf did McG volunteer for my trial?

~~Wf~~ (Note: He was right in '65, *


But let himself be over-ruled!

and why was he so wrong in File '65?

Wf did he lie to Morton Mintz about
delegation?

What will his book say?

How Dans he admit our threats in 61, 62
now? (Betts)



20 Oct 87

1. JFK seems to have been determined not to invade Cuba —

or "en" to strike missiles (or SAMs?)


[Was McN dissembling — Oct 27 transcript?]

Would he admit it now — as
in case of "value of our sup,"
"FC threats" ?]

2. just as he was "determined" (REF^{to me, 1967}) not
to fight blockade on ground, like French
— i.e. invade SVN (or NVN) :

3. But in both cases he had to hide this
in gov, as well as to US public
(and to "enemy" and to allies)

4. Hoover was bad to direct steps — to
hide his true aims (moves to Europe, achieving
to VN, blockade) that prompted stalemate + RISKS
(Dein corp; public statements' SECRECY ON HIS DISAGREE
OF ESCALATION
and to "demonstrate" false . missives (bluff))



MENTS WITH ADVISORS AND FAILURE TO ACCEPT
THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS


[SCE by discovery about JFK vs.
Taylor / Rostow in 1961 over TROOPS AND
as in 1962! BOMBING!

AND LIES ABOUT THIS ("Q.M.")
AS LATE AS JUNE '71 (Taylor!)
(lifting ~~misconceptions~~ "misconceptions",
wishful, lies to Pres (military
responsibility, the wishfuls,"
i.e. just Lyndon's (Stimulus?)
"cognitive process" model.

vs. under Pres politics, cowardice,
risk-taking, fear of humiliation, obedience,
lies/secrecy...

not "sleep-walking" — though,
as if sleep-walking — but with
eyes open

("as if hypnotized" — see
Found an obsession, group, business
(transfer to leader of faith (mother?)
loyalty.



The role of his policy⁺ were greater than
he realized on Saturday, Oct 27, 1962 —
things he won, without etc —

but were realized in 1964-75 in VN,
after he died (and perhaps would have
been had he lived 1)


(Hillemann?) see Whiting on his plans wrot Much
(+ see RFR to me, '67 — on 63-64)

+ see JFK/Mansfield (O'Donnell) in 62 (63?)
on waiting till ^{after} '64 ...

as, in '62, ... fear of election ...

AND SEE ARMS RACE: prompter
of MCN (+ VFR? McGB) that it
was unnecessary (dangerous)

→ The System was dangerous, made: yet it had promoted them,
it was exciting, and they were "running" it — and ought
[Best + Biggest think themselves on the fin-
inner, private (hidden, kind about, closely)
dovishness, wisdom; and the saw "mad"
quality of JCS (see letters, RFR — "I had had
us've got MCN) Congress, public; how, how briefly
they were there; but "missed" nothing down with
they were doing to maintain System, TAKE RISKS: DENIAL



Oct 27 transcript

Hyp: JFK origin was not at failure to
remove minutes before Oct 15,
but at resistance to Travel Oct 15-27,
esp. 21-27


Col failure to talk to Turk directly,
22-27 Oct!

(lies about this ^{subversion} since 1962 on part
of lie about JFK consequence denial to
Travel, not moving to "have minutes off
the board" so we could strike, with
narrowed risk of retal. vs. Turkey."

This was McN's position, not JFK's!

Hyp: JFK was glad to have minutes in
Turkey to Travel — rather than to have to
Travel Berlin!

[Hyp on last night: JFK picks up McN's
teacher, tells th to Dahygin, in hopes of getting
a deal (small blanet, + stick)
BURLATSKY says Turkish Travel was part of war —



Can Dabney afford to prepare for a
public Trade — did R hope this would be
results? But ^{the} not press on Sunday?
e.g. give letter/side man on Sunday?
Costs AA!

A same approach won (beyond bank drama,
wrt SU, not Cuba)

but for reasons they didn't foresee,
wrt big risks " " "
so banks don't look good;

("But the down on Red! See!")


(like Bulls in early 1987).

(^{was won} still bulls in Oct)

though Dabney ^(also?) was wrong to believe ~~the~~
(like Banks!) that tanks couldn't win.

JFK strategy would not have been risky
if he had definitely (as is his on mind?)
divided on no reason on Sunday (he didn't)
OR could he certainly have not acted to
another

[SEE HIS INTENT ON UN! PER 7
TO ME, 67]



Oct 20-87

VFR strategy — vs. Stinson — was
to be toys, initially — at time of
(“on s'engage, puis on voit”)
announcing the situation

(i.e. that he had been wrong, “credulous/trusting of docs” (!)
inattentive, ... exposed to Raph
challenges...)

^{withheld,}
(see Sec. Davis of France
in announcing Kilger troops had left
Chad, with the hint;
Chad, “discovering” Samir Culhan
bujaoui (^{pre-1979} secret year; killing SALT-II)
Carter, a affair

(claimed, disentangled, to have been
surprised, embarrassed, shocked [W#47]
and died little

just after hostages taken by him!

[Fake “crises”]

[Motiv: to eat ECK]

20 Oct 87

But linked to fears & "crises"
minimal commitment
and risks


and JFK hoped risks would have
involved NATO/India ^{+ public} to accept (Stevenson's)
trade — but was he right? Prob. not.
Ad back then would have been worse
of Oct 28 than on Oct 21-22 (Stevenson).

WATCH ESCALATION IN PERSIAN GULF —

FROM HERE ON! (First US attack

yesterday, 19 Oct 87)

(with passive, paralyzed fascination —
like a snake's ~~eye~~ prey?)



CMC

20 Oct 81

JFK:

Good news

But

Bad News

- 1.) Was wise - evaluating
- "fairness" of trade
 - "in eyes of world" (?)

- risk of loss of control
 - dangers of escalation
 - prob. of escalation
 - risk of war
 - honor of war
 - honor of invasion
 - willingness to accept
- SC as "equal"

(despite lack of
manned parity)

- venturing about U-2
- "shootdown"
- appra. of allies' tendencies

- 3) Spurred his will,
cautiously, in certain reports:

- no major news
- no immediate retal for
- U-2

BUT

- 2) gradual to actually:

- rules not "acceptable"
- domestic political rules
- creation of "crises"

(inconstant warnings;

bluff - K's assurance?

subter-sneaky

- consider of air-strike
- blockade

- ignored Castro motives, ^{independence}
- ignored (?) Khrushchev -
interpreting SC motives

- saw U-2/AA as K move
- RFK "ignores ult" &
news; 48-hr bluff

4. BUT accepted "consensus"
for Saturday: no trade.

~~despite~~ (despite ①)

[How much did JFK fear

leak/denunciation from within
Explan/JCS?

BUT

5. Advisors' judgments

(except: Ball

CBV!

McLone!

6. Advisors'/innovators

LIES can win

(is it childish,

is fear of ^{McG B's} revelation of

JFK's wisdom, to counter

of advisors' foolishness,

the influence/JFK capture,

and this (McGB) sway

his for 25 years?!

and the revels they took,

unwittingly but (is

lack of JFK/McN will

from and cause of loss of
control) foolishly?

7. die (if Pres, too) about

Stevenson (big 'alone -

as "approach" - though he didn't
w t to be "tough point, then compromise"

